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of estate terminated on February 16, 1935 should be immaterial to the maintenance of this cause of action.
It is unfortunate that our Court of Appeals has blindly
followed its early decision in Hintze v. Thomas23 upon this
point, since the decision in that case was based upon dictum
in the early English case of Fogg v. Dobie 4 Now, the
interesting feature of this dictum is the fact that it is contrary to the explicit decision, after full argument, in the
earlier English case of Harley v. King. 5 At the present
time Maryland is the sole jurisdiction which still follows
this mistaken dictum of this early English case.26 Our
Court of Appeals could do much in clarifying the doctrine
of privity of estate, if it would recognize its mistake, and
expressly hold that privity of estate is only essential at the
time of the breach as a means of fixing the contractual liability upon the assignee, but that once such liability arises
the continuance of such privity of estate is nonessential to
the maintenance of an action at law upon this personal
cause of action.
JUDICIAL TERMINATION OF A CONTRACT-RECOVERY FOR PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF AN
ENTIRE CONTRACT AFTER BREACHBRIGHT V. GANAS'
Plaintiff-appellee served deceased for four or five years
under an oral contract whereby deceased agreed to leave
him $20,000. On the death of the employer plaintiff-appellee filed suit against the executor, the defendant-appellant, declaring on the oral contract in a special count and
also on the common counts. The evidence showed that deceased had repeatedly stated that he was going to leave
plaintiff-appellee $20,000, that he had paid him no regular
wages during his lifetime, and that while the master was
dying plaintiff made improper advances to the master's
wife. The lower court directed a verdict for defendant
on the special count, and the jury found for the plaintiff
on the common counts in the sum of $8,990. Defendantappellant appealed. Held, Reversed without new trial.
7 Md. 346 (1855).
2, 3 Younge C. Ch. 96, 160 Eng. Rep. 629 (1838).
25 2 Cromp. M. & R. 18, 150 Eng. Rep. 8 (1835).
26 See for a full discussion Tiffany's Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 158 (dd),
particularly note 480 for a discussion of the Maryland decisions.
23

" 189 At. 427 (Md. 1937).

CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
Plaintiff-appellee has proved an express contract and cannot therefore recover on an implied contract. One term
of a contract between master and servant is that the servant
will be faithful and loyal. Plaintiff-appellee has breached
this by his conduct toward deceased's wife and can therefore recover nothing.
The case presents two points of interest: 1. The propriety of the Court's action in effecting the servant's discharge when his master had never discharged him; 2.
Whether or not a servant can recover on quantum meruit
on an entire contract, partially performed on his part, and
breached by him. These problems will be considered in
inverse order. For the purpose of the entire discussion it
must be conceded that making improper advances to the
employer's wife is sufficient reason to justify discharge2 ,
and that the evidence probably justified such a ruling as
a matter of law.'
The earlier rule undoubtedly was ". . . that one who
fails to carry out his part of a contract, thus giving the
other party thereto the right to prevent his further action
under it, loses his right to claim anything by virtue of its
provisions in his favor, and . . . cannot recover wages
pro rata for time served by him." 4 The reason behind the
rule was that the service to be performed being entire, and
compensation for its completion being entire, complete performance of the service was a condition precedent to recovery of the compensation. Further the servant had no
right to recover on a quantum meruit, for to allow him so
to recover would be to allow him to reap the benefits of
his own misconduct.
So, where an employee was engaged to work for one
year at $120, and before the end of the term voluntarily
2Atkin
v. Acton, 4 C. & P. 208, 172 Eng. Rep. 673 (1830), holding that
assault of employer's maid-servant with intent to ravish was cause for
discharge without notice; Wood v. Barker, 2 Sask. L. 400, same, seduction
of employer's daughter; Dwyer v. Cane, Adm'r., 6 La. Ann. 707 (1851),
same, immoral conduct toward female slaves. On the general proposition
of discharge see 18 R. C. L. 518; Dorrance v. Hoopes, 122 Md. 344, 90 Atl.
92, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1012 (1914).
1 Dorrance v. Hoopes, supra note 1. Whether the evidence in fact justified such a conclusion Is debatable. Examination of the record discloses
that the letter to his employer's wife merely stated plaintiff's great love for
her and intimated that there might be a possibility of his love being reciprocated. There was no proposal of any specific future acts. The letter
takes on an even more harmless aspect when we remember that the record
also discloses that plaintiff had addressed an earlier and admittedly innocuous letter to the wife, which bad been brought to Col. Darden's attention.
'5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 524n, and cases there cited.
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and without cause left his employer's service, it was held
in a Massachusetts case that he could recover nothing
either on the contract or on quantum meruit, the Court
saying,5 "The law . . . denies only to a party an advantage from his own wrong. It requires him to act justly
by a faithful performance of his own engagements, before
he exacts the fulfillment of dependent obligations on the
part of others. It will not admit of the monstrous absurdity, that a man may voluntarily and without cause violate
his agreement, and make the very breach of that agreement the foundation of an action which he could not maintain under it."
'While it is said' that the majority of courts now repudiate this rule, substantial support can be found for it among
the earlier cases, and to some extent among the more modern ones.7 The present majority rule, called the "modern
or American rule" 8 has occurred because of the slow realization by the courts that the old rule worked too great a
hardship in many cases, even though the employee was
the cause of the breach. Thus Professor Mechem states :?
"It is not every case of misconduct in this regard, however, even though sufficient to warrant the agent's discharge, which will deprive him of all claim to compensation. . . . If . . . though the agent has been negligent or
has not performed according to his undertaking, his services are still of some appreciable value to the principal,
over and above all damages sustained by him by reason of
the default, the agent should be entitled to recover that
value. "
The leading case on this rule is the New Hampshire
0 In that case the plaintiff agreed
case of Britton v. Turner."
to work for defendant for the term of one year, defendant
agreeing to pay for the year's labor the sum of $120. Plaintiff worked for nine months, and then left defendant's service without his consent. Plaintiff brought assumpsit for
5 Stark

v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267, 275, 13 Am. Dec. 425, 430 (1824).
6 18 R. C. L. 539.
7 Olmstead v. Beale, 19 Pick. 528 (1837) ; Posey v. Garth, 7 Mo. 94, 37
Am. Dec. 183 (1841) ; Libhart v. Wood, 1 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 265, 37 Am.
Dec. 461 (1841) ; Miller v. Goddard, 34 Me. 102, 56 Am. Dec. 638 (1852) ;
Smith v. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173 (1858); Larkin v. Buck, 11 Ohio St. 561
(1860) ; Von Heyne v. Tompkins, 89 Minn. 77, 93 N. W. 901, 5 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 524 (1903), and others.
85 L. R. A. (N. S.) 527n; 18 R. C. L. 539. There is some disagreement
among the authorities, Jorpu8 Juris states that the earlier rule is still the
majority rule, 39 C. J. 146.
1I Mechem, Agency (2d Ed.) 1152, Sec. 1548.
10 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713 (1834).
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the value of his services while in defendant's employ. In
an elaborate and closely argued opinion Chief Justice
Parker reached the conclusion that plaintiff could recover
the value of beneficial services rendered less the amount of
damage caused defendant by the breach. This conclusion
was based upon the argument that the earlier rule was
founded upon a technicality, and that under it the employer received more by the breach of contract than he was
entitled to because of the breach by the employee. Analogy
was drawn to the case of a contract to build a house, where
the work is done, but not in the prescribed manner, and the
contractor is allowed to recover on quantum meruit because the other party has received the benefit of the labor
and materials. 1 Admitting that it was true that there was
in such a case an acceptance of the work and materials, it
was argued that the contract in question was one to labor
from day to day, and that the other party in reality stipulates to receive it from day to day. In other words, there
is necessarily an acceptance of labor done in pursuance of
the contract, though the entire amount of labor may never
be completed. On this basis the court said, "If . . . a
party actually receives labor and materials, and thereby
derives a benefit and advantage, over and above the damage which has resulted from the breach of contract by the
other party, the labor actually done and the value received
furnish a new consideration, and the law thereupon raises
a promise to pay to the extent of the reasonable worth of
the excess." 2
The merit and equity of this decision soon made itself
apparent to courts of other states. Many were unwilling
to change the rule because of past decisions, but others,
more willing to throw over the traces of the often unjust
common law rule, adopted the conclusion of the New Hampshire court.
We come now to a consideration of the Maryland cases
on the point. In the case of Mallonee v. Duff'8 our Court
of Appeals adopted the proposition that one who enters
into a contract to perform certain labor and agrees that
11Maryland cases to this effect are: Meyer v. Frenkil, 113 Md. 36, 77 Atl.
369 (1910) ; Presbyterian Church, Etc. v. Hoopes Artificial Stone Co., 66 Md.
598, 8 Atl. 752 (1887) ; Watchman & Bratt v. Cook, et al., 5 G. & J. 239

(1883).
1s
1s

Supra note 10, 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. at 719.
72 Md. 283, 19 Atl. 708 (1890).
The proposition seems to be assumed

by the Court, for no authority is given in the report for the statement.
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his employer may discharge him in case of drunkenness,
and who is discharged for such offense, does not thereby
forfeit what he has earned according to the contract price
up to the time of discharge. The case could probably be
distinguished on the theory that the provision for discharge
was a provision for an earlier termination of the contract
on the happening of a certain event, and that, the event having occurred, the contract was terminated and fully performed.
The next case of interest is Thomas v. Cheney.1" In that
case plaintiff had contracted for the services of a jockey
and assigned his contract to defendant subject to the assent
of the jockey's father. The father having refused his assent, the Court held that plaintiff could not recover on the
special contract because the condition precedent had not
been performed, and that he could not recover on quantumn
meruit for the services rendered by the jockey pending assent because "there can, in the nature of things, be no implied contract where there is an express contract." 1 5 The
Court has unmistakeably adopted this doctrine, holding that
where there is an express contract, recovery can be had on
quantum meruit only if the work is fully performed and
accepted by the parties, or the contract is abandoned by the
parties, or by some act of the party sought to be charged,
the fulfillment of the contract was prevented.16
Again in Schneider v. Brewing Co."' the Court in dicta
affirmed the rule announced in the principal case, saying,
"If the contract had been entire and indivisible both as to
period of service and as to payment of compensation, the
plaintiff's breach would have deprived him of any right of
action for the partial performance.""8 Thus it can be seen
that the Court is not, in the decision in the principal case,
announcing a new rule, though it must be said that it is a
harsh one.
In view of the decisions in this state holding that in
actions for work and materials furnished under a contract
plaintiff is not precluded from recovery by noncompletion
14114 Md. 362, 79 Atl. 590 (1911).
Ibid, 114 Md. 367, 79 AtI. 592.
16 Ibid.
On the general proposition see Jenkins v. Long, 8 Md. 132
(1855); Denmead v. Coburn, 15 Md. 29 (1859) ; Gill v. Vogler, 52 Md. 663
(1879) ; Fairfax Forrest Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Chambers, 75 Md. 604, 23
Atl. 1024 (1892) ; Breitinger v. Heisler, 155 Md. 157, 141 Ati. 538 (1928).
17 136 Md. 151, 110 Atl. 218 (1910).
Ibid, 136 Md. 154, 110 Atl. 219.
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if there was an acceptance by the defendant,1 9 it is submitted that plaintiff could have been allowed to recover in
the principal case. To do so would be in effect to overrule
the decisions in the three cases above cited, but would not
be a disaffirmance of the rule that there can be no implied
contract where there is an express one. Admittedly where
the party to be charged has accepted the work and materials, he is chargeable for their reasonable worth, though
plaintiff has committed a breach of contract; for to hold
otherwise is to cause a forfeiture, which the law abhors.
By the very nature of the contract between master and servant there must be an acceptance of the work as it is done.
In other words, though the contract and compensation are
both entire, the acceptance must be piece-meal. It may be
urged that in the work and materials cases the party to be
charged has an opportunity to reject and thus be relieved
on all liability on the contract, while in service contracts
the servant's partial performance does not admit of rejection. The answer to such an objection is that, while it is
true that there can be rejection in the work and materials
cases, when rejection occurs the contractor is left with the
results of his work, which he can either sell to another or
dismantle and use. By the rejection the contractor is not
left with nothing as a result of his work. On the other hand
to allow the employer upon breach of the contract of service to reject all services, both performed and unperformed,
is to leave the servant with nothing at all, though the employer may have received great benefit from the work done.
The object of the earlier rule was to prevent the willful
and voluntary breach of a contract without cause. However valid the reason may be, it must be admitted that the
damages occasioned the employer by a voluntary breach
without cause are in the ordinary case not proportionate to
the injustice done the employee by depriving him of all
compensation for his faithful performance for the major
portion of the time. Conceding that the employee by his
breach has discharged the employer from all obligation
under the contract, the law raises an implied contract because of acceptance of the services. "Where the contract
is to labor from day to day, for a certain period, the party
for whom the labor is done, in truth stipulates to receive it
19Supra note 11. "If after work was done, though not pursuant to the
contract, the party for whom it was done, accepted it, it would seem right
and proper, that he should pay for it, what It is worth. This we think,
justice would require, and it is believed, the principles of law do not forbid
it." 5 G. & J. at 263.
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from day to day, as it is performed, and although the other
may not eventually do all he has contracted to do, there has
necessarily been an acceptance of what has been done in
pursuance of the contract, and the party must have understood, when he made the contract, that there was to be such
an acceptance." 0
The conclusion is that by drawing the same analogy as
was drawn in the case of Britton v. Turner,," a more just
decision could have been reached, though it would have entailed overruling the Cheney case and the dicta in the
Schneider case. The amount of compensation to which the
plaintiff-appellee would have been entitled would have been
$8,990, as found by the jury to be the reasonable worth of
his services, less the amount of damages caused by the
breach, in the principal case, little more than nominal.
But, even though the principle of stare decisis may have
entailed the affirmance of the minority rule, it is submitted
that the action of the court in holding the contract terminated when there had been no such action by the employer
was at least questionable. While it is true that the employee's act was sufficient cause for discharge, it is also a
fact that neither the employer nor his wife ever discharged
him. The only mention in the principal case of the possibility of waiver is for the purpose of circumventing the point,
the court saying, ". . . it cannot be assumed that the employer would not have done the thing that common decency
and loyalty to his wife would have required him to do."
The general proposition as to waiver is stated as follows:
"Whether an employer by his conduct has waived his right
to object to his employee's work is a mixed question of law
and fact to be submitted to the jury with proper instructions"" except in clear cases. While it is true that a
waiver cannot ordinarily be inferred from an employer's
acts where he has no knowledge of the employee's breach,
it is arguable at least, that the employer's wife should have
either made known the breach to her husband, or herself
have discharged the employee. Conceding that the husband's physical condition made it impossible to communicate the facts to him, can it not be argued that, by the same
token, the wife therefore had authority to act as his agent"
and herself effect the dismissal.
20 Supra note 10, 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. at 718.
21 Supra note 10.
2 189 AtI. 427, 431.
23 39 C. J. 209.
See also 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007.
21 Meyer v. Frenkil, 116 Md. 411, 82 AtI. 208, Ann. Cas. 1913C 875 (1911);
4 Amer. & Eng. Ency. (2d) 856.
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If this be taken to be the true rule on that point, it must
be admitted that either husband or wife could have and
should have exercised a right of dismissal. The question
which next presents itself, then, is whether there were sufficient facts to go to the jury on the question of waiver. The
record shows that the breach occurred on or about the last
day of August, 1933, and that the plaintiff was not told that
he must leave until about November 20th, the day of the
employer's funeral, at which time the contract had already
terminated. The report does not show what services plaintiff performed during these two and one-half months, but
whatever they were, the fact remains that his employment
was continued and his services accepted from the time of
breach until the termination of the contract.
Professor Mechem states the rule to be: "Where the
principal undertakes to discharge because of specific acts of
misconduct, he must, it is held, act with reasonable promptness after the discovery; otherwise he will be deemed to
have waived or condoned them.'" 5 Speaking of condonation, the L. R. A. annotator says, "More especially is such
an inference (of condonation) proper where the servant is
retained to the end of the term."' 6 In the New York case
of McGrath v. Bell 7 the servant was retained for 12 days
after knowledge of the breach and the court held the question of condonation to be one for the jury. In Wood on
Master and Servant, it is stated" that prima facie there is
a waiver where a delinquent servant is retained, and condonation is presumed.
On the other hand it must be conceded that the employer
is not bound to discharge the employee immediately, but
only within a reasonable time. 9 Under the circumstances
of the principal case, then, it was at least a question for
the jury as to whether there had been a waiver of the
breach, i. e., whether the reasonable time for discharge had
passed; and, it is submitted, the Court was in error in itself
terminating the contract, especially since a jury had already
shown itself to be constrained to take a more lenient view
of the plaintiff's conduct.
There is, however, possible justification for the court's
action if the view is taken that the wife did not have author15 I Mechem, Agency (2d Ed.) 440, Sec. 611.
20 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1009.
27 I Jones & S.,
(N. Y. Super. Ct.) 195.
"1 Sec. 123. See also Jones v. Vestry of Trinity Parish, 19 Fed. 59 (1883).
"Atlantic Compress Co. v. Young, 118 Ga. 868, 45 S. E. 677 (1903);
Huntington v. Claflin, 23 N. Y. Super. Ct. (10 Bosw.) 262.
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ity to discharge. In that case plaintiff is guilty of misconduct which never came to his employer's attention. If the
employer had no knowledge of plaintiff's misconduct, then
there can be no question of waiver; for the doctrine of
waiver finds its basis in equitable estoppel3 ° In this view,
if knowledge of the misconduct came to the employer for
the first time after the contract had been terminated but
before the employee had been paid, it might be said that the
employer would be justified in refusing to pay for any of
the services rendered, the contract being entire. Thus, in
the principal case, the defendant-executor, who stands in
the place of the employer, would be upheld in his refusal
to pay the plaintiff the $20,000 which according to the contract was to be his compensation. Such a view would be
reasonable in a jurisdiction allowing recovery for services
rendered on a quantum meruit, but it is submitted that,
where the proposition of the principal case is followed on
this point, the Court should at least be reluctant to uphold
such a view and thus deprive the employee of all compensation though he has completely performed.
Again, by drawing a distinction between a breach and
misconduct justifying discharge, the action of the Court in
declaring the contract terminated can be upheld. If plaintiff's conduct is regarded as misconduct justifying discharge, then the employer, when he learns of it, would have
to affirmatively discharge his employee, or be held to have
waived the misconduct. If, however, it be regarded as a
breach of contract, and thus an act which of itself terminates the contract, the defendant-executor, standing in the
place of the employer, would be justified in resisting payment on the ground of the breach. It may be stated generally, however, that misconduct is not regarded as a
breach"' in the sense used above, though courts often inadvertently disregard the distinction drawn and use the
terms interchangeably. Even this weak justification does
not stand, however, in the light of the Court's language,
above quoted, that "it cannot be assumed that the employer
would not have done the thing that common decency and
loyalty to his wife would have required him to do" 32 ; for the
Court can mean nothing else by this language than discharge, and if the misconduct be regarded as a breach there
39 C. J. 88, note 57b.
IlThe authorities all refer to grounds of discharge, rather than to breach
of contract of employment. See 18 R. C. L. 517; 39 C. J. 80.
82 Supra note 22.
80
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would not have been any necessity for such rationale of the
Court's action in thus judicially terminating the contract.
The conclusion is that there was sufficient evidence in the
case to go to the jury on the question of waiver, but that,
even if justification can be found for holding the contract
to be terminated, the Court should have been very reluctant
to adopt such a view and thus, because of the peculiar
Maryland rule refusing recovery on quantum meruit, de.
prive plaintiff of all compensation after he had rendered
valuable services.

APPRAISAL OF SHARES OF DISSENTING STOCKHOLDERS IN CONSOLIDATION -AMERICAN
GENERAL CORPORATION V. CAMP, ET AL. 1
Eight separate but allied corporations2 consolidated
into one corporation known as American General Corporation. The vote of the stockholders was not unanimous, but
the dissentients (preferred stockholders) were the owners
of much less than the amount required to prevent the consolidation. The dissenting stockholders demanded payment for their stock, but were unable to agree with the defendant upon the fair value and filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City for the appointment of three
disinterested commissioners to appraise the fair value of
their stock. The commissioners determined the fair value
of the stock to be its intrinsic value on a liquidation, and
made an award based thereon including interest from the
date of the consolidation. The dissenting stockholders
and the defendant corporation each excepted to the award
made by the Commissioners.
On appeal the award was modified. The award itself
was proper but interest should not have been allowed.' The
Commissioners properly found that the fair value of the
stock was its intrinsic value in a liquidation.sa The award
made by the Commissioners is presumed correct unless
clear evidence shows that the award was incorrectly made.
1190 AtI. 225 (Md. 1937).

Seven were Maryland corporations and one was a Delaware corporation.
"The decision of the court on this point has been changed by Acts, 1937,
Chapter 504, which provides that interest shall be allowable from the date
of the consolidation.
"a Throughout the opinion, however, the Court emphasized that value
upon a liquidation was not the only factor to be considered in an appraisal.

